Lessard v. Schmidt and its Implications for Involuntary Civil Commitment in Wisconsin by Remington, Michael J.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 57
Issue 1 1973 (Number 1) Article 4
Lessard v. Schmidt and its Implications for
Involuntary Civil Commitment in Wisconsin
Michael J. Remington
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Michael J. Remington, Lessard v. Schmidt and its Implications for Involuntary Civil Commitment in Wisconsin, 57 Marq. L. Rev. 65
(1973).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol57/iss1/4
LESSARD V. SCHMIDT AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR INVOLUNTARY CIVIL
COMMITMENT IN WISCONSIN
MICHAEL J. REMINGTON*
* . before the Law stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper
there comes a man from the country who begs for admittance to
the Law. But the doorkeeper says that he cannot admit the man
at the moment. The man, on reflection, asks if he will be allowed,
then, to enter later. 'It is possible,' answers the doorkeeper, 'but
not at this moment.' Since the door leading into the Law stands
open as usual and the doorkeeper steps to one side, the man
bends down to peer through the entrance. When the doorkeeper
sees that, he laughs and says: 'If you are so strongly tempted, try
to get in without my permission. But not that I am powerful. And
I am only the lowest doorkeeper. From hall to hall, keepers stand
at every door, one more powerful than the other. And the sight
of the third man is already more than even I can stand.' These
are difficulties which the man from the country has not expected
to meet, the Law, he thinks should be accessible to every man
and at all times, but when he looks more closely at the doorkee-
per in his furred robe, with his huge pointed nose and long thin
Tartar beard, he decides that he had better wait until he gets
permission to enter. The doorkeeper gives him a stool and lets
him sit down at the side of the door. There he sits waiting for
days and years. "I
The newcomer to the field of involuntary civil commitment is
always surprised at how close a guard Kafka's doorkeepers have
kept on this area of the law. The public hears relatively little about
the mechanics of involuntary civil commitment. Lawyers them-
* B.S., University of Wisconsin, 1967; J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School, 1973;
Peace Corps Volunteer, Ivory Coast, 1969-1971. The Author began serving as Law Clerk
to Chief Judge John W. Reynolds, United States District Court, Eastern District, Wiscon-
sin, on July 1, 1973, and thus was not a participant in the drafting of the Lessard v. Schmidt
decision.
The Author wishes to acknowledge the use of, and reference to, an unpublished article
entitled "Involuntary Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: Lessard v. Schmidt," currently on
file with the National Clearinghouse Review for Legal Services, Chicago, Illinois, which
he co-authored with Ms. Karen Ward, J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School, 1973.
Appreciation is expressed for the aid and advice given by Ms. Ward, and also by
Professor Gordon Baldwin, University of Wisconsin Law School.
1. F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL, (Afred A. Knopf, New York, 1970), pp. 267-268.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
selves often do not know the first thing about how to civilly commit
someone, and are forced to do some quick research or consult
outside sources when a prospective problem is presented to them.
Judges have been anything but consistent in their rulings and dis-
cussions concerning the legal problems inherent in restraining indi-
viduals who have not committed crimes. And legislators have been
neglectful in keeping abreast of changes and breakthroughs in the
fields of psychiatry and treatment of mental illness.
INTRODUCTION
The debate over adequate procedures for the involuntary com-
mitment of mentally ill individuals has been a modern one. Black-
stone reports that the common law had little occasion to consider
such question, because public institutions for the mentally ill did
not exist.2 In the past, the family was expected, and indeed,
required by social mores, to care for the mentally ill.' The con-
struction of mental institutions is not one of the priorities of a
young and developing country. In the United States, the first such
institution was built around the middle of the eighteenth century,
with few hospitals built anywhere until the middle of the nineteenth
century.' The State of Wisconsin opened its first state mental hos-
pital in 1859. The legislature in that year provided that certain
procedures be respected before admission to the new institution.
For example, it was required that the prospective patient be exam-
ined by a "respectable physician" and that this physician certify
that he found the patient to be insane.5 In 1897, the Wisconsin
mental commitment procedures were thoroughly revised;' the re-
sult was a procedure that was to essentially exist for seventy-five
years.7
The basic procedures for the involuntary commitment of the
mentally disabled in Wisconsin prior to the decision of Lessard v.
Schmidt8 may be summarized as follows. Formerly, three persons,
one of whom must have been a close relation to the prospective
patient, could file a petition for judicial inquiry into the prospective
2. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 305 (Christian ed. 1827).
3. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 4 (1971).
4. Id.
5. Wis. LAWS, 1859, ch. 218.
6. Wis. LAWS, 1897, ch. 319.
7. See Dix, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A Reexamination, 51
MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1967).
8. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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commitee's mental condition.' The court then was to appoint two
physicians, one being a psychiatrist, to conduct an examination
into the individual's mental condition.10 Subsequent to this, the two
physicians made a written report." The statutes provided for the
setting of a hearing, and for the service of notice on the patient. 2
A judicial hearing was given as a matter of right, its importance
explained to the patient, 3 and possibly a guardian ad litem ap-
pointed for him. 4 The patient could demand a jury trial, 5 and
under certain conditions, examine the physicians." It was the duty
of the court (or the jury) to decide (1) whether the patient was
mentally ill, and (2) whether he should be sent to a hospital for the
mentally ill.17-
A procedure also existed whereby, on the petition of one physi-
cian and two other individuals, a prospective patient who was
"dangerous to himself or others" could be detained for up to five
days. 8 Under this procedure, a judicial proceeding had to have
been initiated as soon as possible. 9 If "safety" required it, a court
could order a patient detained up to ten days pending a judicial
hearing. 20 Between the time when the report of the examining phy-
sicians was received and the judicial hearing, the court could order
the patient detained for up to thirty days; this could be extended,
upon application to the court, for up to ninety days. 21 If it appeared
to the court that notice of hearing would be "injurious" to the
patient, this right could be bypassed. 2  In addition, it was not con-
sidered a necessity that the patient be present at the hearing. 3
Finally, there was further provision that if the judge was in doubt
about the patient's medical condition, he could order up to ninety
days commitment for "medical observation" before determining
9. Wis. STAT. § 51.01(1) (1971).
10. Wis. STAT. § 51.01(2) (1971).
11. Wis. STAT. § 51.01(2)(b) (1971).
12. Wis. STAT. § 51.01(1)(a) (1971).
13. Wis. STAT. § 51.02(2) (1971).
14. Wis. STAT. § 51.02(4) (1971).
15. Wis. STAT. § 51.03 (1971).
16. Wis. STAT. § 51.02(1) (1971).
17. Wis. STAT. § 51.03 (1971).
18. Wis. STAT. § 51.04(1) (1971).
19. Id.
20. Wis. STAT. § 51.04(2) (1971).
21. Wis. STAT. § 51.04(3) (1971).
22. Wis. STAT. § 51.02(1)(a) (1971).
23. Wis. STAT. § 51.02 (1971).
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whether the patient was to be committed.24
These were Wisconsin's procedures until the decision of
Lessard v. Schmidt. 5 These were the procedures used to involun-
tarily commit 4,424 individuals in Wisconsin mental institutions
between June 30, 1971, and June 30, 1972.2 On one hand, these
procedures represented what was surely thought to be elaborate
safeguards surrounding involuntary civil commitment. On the
other hand, they made it possible to involuntarily detain a prospec-
tive patient for up to one hundred and forty-five days without a
hearing.27
II. THE DECISION OF LESSARD V. SCHMIDT
A. Introduction and Factual Background
On October 29, 1971, Mrs. Alberta Lessard was picked up by
two police officers in front of her home in West Allis, Wisconsin.
She was subsequently taken to the Mental Health Center, North
Division, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and detained. 2 What happened
to her during the following months was to become the basis of her
civil action, 9 and her ultimate victory in overturning Wisconsin's
civil commitment procedures.
Lessard v. Schmidt was a class action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against the enforcement of selected portions of
Sections 51.02, 51.03 and 51.04 of the Wisconsin Statutes."0 The
24. WIS. STAT. § 51.02(5)(b) (1971).
25. The decision was handed down on October 18, 1972.
26. State Department of Health and Social Services, Yearly Population Report-Basis
for Admission of Patients Admitted to Wisconsin State and County Mental Institutions
During the Year June 30, 1971, thru June 30, 1972.
27. These procedures must have seemed to prospective patients not unlike Kafka's
doorkeepers who denied access to the law to the man from the country.
28. 349 F. Supp. at 1080.
29. Id. at 1082.
30. The relevant portions of Sections 51.02 - .04 are as follows: Wis. STAT. § 51.02
(1971) states, in part:
(I) Notice of Hearing. (a) On receipt of the application or of the report of the
examining physicians, the court shall appoint a time and place for hearing thereof
to be served upon the patient. . . . which notice shall state that application has been
made for the examination into his mental condition (withholding the names of the
applicants) and that such application will be heard at the time and place named in
the notice; but if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the notice would be
injurious or without advantage to the patient by reason of his mental condition, the
service of notice may be omitted. The court may, in its discretion, cause notice to
be given to such other persons as it deems advisable. If the notice is served the court
may proceed to hold the hearing at the time and place specified therein, or, if it is
dispensed with, at any time . ..
[Vol. 57
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action -was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, on behalf of the
class consisting of Mrs. Lessard and "all other persons 18 years
of age or older who are being held involuntarily pursuant to any
emergency, temporary or permanent commitment provision of the
(2) Hearing. At the hearing any party in interest . . .may examine the physicians
and other witnesses, on oath, before the court and may offer evidence. At the opening
of the hearing the judge shall state to the patient, if present, in simple, non-technical
language the purpose of the examination and his right to be heard and to protest
and oppose the proceedings and his commitment; but where it is apparent to the
judge that the mentality of the patient is such that he would not understand, he may
omit such statement...
(4) Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem. At any stage of the proceedings, the court
may, if it determines that the best interest of the patient requires it, appoint a
guardian ad litem for him.
(5) Court's Decision. At the conclusion of the hearing the court may:
(a) Discharge the patient if satisfied that he is not mentally ill or infirm or deficient,
so as to require care and treatment, or
(b) Order him detained for observation if in doubt as to his mental condition, or
(c) Order him committed if satisfied that he is mentally ill or infirm or deficient
and that he is a proper subject for custody and treatment, or
(d) In case of trial by jury, order him discharged or committed in accordance with
the jury verdict.
Wis. STAT. § 51.03 (1971) states, in part:
If a jury is demanded by the alleged mentally ill. . .patient or by a relative or friend
in his behalf, before commitment, the court shall direct that a jury of six people be
drawn to determine the mental condition of the patient. . .At the time of ordering
a jury to be summoned, the court shall fix the date of the hearing, which date shall
not be less than 30 days nor more than 40 days after the demand for a jury is made.
In the meantime the court may order the patient temporarily detained in a designated
public institution, until the date of hearing, for observation...
WIs. STAT. § 51.04 (1971) states, in part:
Temporary detention of persons.
(I) Emergency Provisions. The sheriff. . . may take into temporary custody any
person who is violent or threatens violence and who appears irresponsible and dan-
gerous. The sheriff. . . shall take temporary custody of any person when it appears
by application . . . executed by three persons, one of whom shall be a physician
licensed to practice medicine and surgery in this state, that such person has a mental
illness, is in need of hospitalization, and is irresponsible and dangerous to himself
or others . . .This is an emergency provision intended for the protection of persons
and property. Such person may be kept in custody until regular proceedings are
instituted to cope with the case, but not exceeding five days ...
(2) For Safety. If it appears from the application for his mental examination or
otherwise that safety requires it, the court or a court commissioner if the judge is
not available may order the sheriff or other police officer who has such person in
custody to confine him in a designated place for a specified time, not exceeding 10
days.
(3) Medical Observation. Upon receipt of the report of the physicians the court
may order his detention in a designated instituton for a stated period not exceeding
30 days. Upon the application of the superintendent of the institution or any inter-
ested person the court may extend the detention period, but the temporary detention
shall not exceed 90 days in all.
1973]
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Wisconsin involuntary commitment statute."'3 Because the action
challenged the enforcement of a state statute on federal constitu-
tional grounds, a three judge court was impaneled to hear the
action.3 1
B. Basis of the Action
The statutes were generally challenged on grounds that the
procedure for involuntary civil commitment in Wisconsin denied
due process of law to those affected. More specifically, plaintiffs
alleged that the Wisconsin statutes were in violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution because they permitted detention for a possible maxi-
mum of 145 days without a hearing; failed to make mandatory
notice of all hearings and to give adequate and timely notice when
hearings were given; failed to require notice of the right to trial by
jury; failed to provide a right to counsel and appointed counsel at
a meaningful time, and failed to permit counsel to be present at
psychiatric interviews; permitted hearsay evidence; failed to pro-
tect the privilege against self incrimination; permitted commitment
upon a standard of proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt; and,
finally, neglected to describe the standard for commitment.3
C. The Decision and the Due Process Grounds of Lessard v.
Schmidt
The three judge court agreed with the plaintiffs' contentions,
finding the statutes in question unconstitutional as violative of
plaintiff's right to due process of law. After a very lengthy discus-
sion, the court announced its decision and stated nine bases for its
conclusions.34 In an effort to make the explanation clear, the nine
conclusions of the court shall be discussed separately, although in
the opinion itself, they were overlapped and often discussed
together.
I. Effective and Timely Notice of the "Charges" Under
Which a Person is Sought to be Detained Must be Given. The
Lessard court held that a patient has a right to be informed of the
reasons for his detention, the names of examining physicians and
all other persons who may testify in favor of his continued deten-
31. 349 F. Supp. at 1082.
32. The members of the three-judge court were Circuit Judge Robert A. Sprecher, Chief
District Judge John W. Reynolds, and District Judge Myron L. Gordon.
33. 349 F. Supp. at 1082.
34. Id. at 1103.
[Vol. 57
LESSARD v. SCHMIDT
tion, and the substance of their proposed testimony.35 The court
stated: "Judged by these standards, the Wisconsin statutory
scheme for involuntary civil commitment fails to afford persons
alleged to be mentally ill with adequate procedural safeguards. '36
As authority for this conclusion, the court refers the reader for-
ward to section III-B, of its own opinion 7.3 That section is a
lengthy discussion of the general requirements of due process and
a refutation of the justifications for applying lesser safeguards in
civil as opposed to criminal commitments. The court's rationale
vascillates from parens patriae, to a discussion of the right to
treatment, to the civil-criminal distinction. In re Gault3 is cited
for the proposition that the civil-criminal distinction should be laid
to rest.39 The reference to section III-B in support of the notice
of charges requirement was probably meant to lead the reader to
both Gault and In re Winship," and specifically to the conclusion
that the right to due process in juvenile proceedings would support
the Lessard court's conclusion that notice of charges is required.
2. Adequate Notice of All Rights, Including the Right to a
Jury Trial, is Required. The court also found the Wisconsin stat-
utes to be constitutionally defective in this respect. The court states
that notice of the date, time and place of a scheduled hearing is
insufficient." The "accused" is entitled to notice of his right to jury
trial, the basis for his detention, and "the standard upon which he
may be detained. 42 In addition, the "accused" should be notified
of the names of the examining physicians and all others who may
provide testimony in favor of continued detention, and the sub-
stance of their proposed testimony . 3 Although Gault is not di-
rectly on point regarding the right to notice of all rights, its pres-
ence is felt. In Gault, the Supreme Court stated that "the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that...
the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be
represented by counsel ... - Subsequently, the Court further
35. Id. at 1092.
36. Id. at 1093.
37. Id.
38. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
39. 349 F. Supp. at 1095.
40. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
41. 349 F. Supp. at 1092.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 387 U.S. at 41.
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implied that notice of the privilege against self incrimination is also
required in juvenile proceedings. 5
3. Detention Longer than 48 Hours Without a Hearing on
Probable Cause is Unconstitutional. The court concludes that
emergency detention without benefit of a hearing may not exceed
48 hours.46 This conclusion again stems from the premise that in-
voluntary detention must meet the requirements of procedural due
process. Here, the court applies a compelling state interest test.4 7
That is, since liberty is a fundamental right, the state must show a
compelling reason for infringing upon it. The court admits that the
state may have a compelling state interest in the protection of both
society and the individual and therefore gain the power of emer-
gency detention over those persons who threaten violence to them-
selves or others. Nevertheless, the court specifies that such emer-
gency measures can only be justified for the "length of time neces-
sary to arrange for a hearing before a neutral judge at which
probable cause for the detention must be established. '' 4 Although
no authority is provided for this conclusion, if the procedure is
justifiable only as an "emergency", it would follow that the emer-
gency should last only so long as it takes to set up the hearing
required by fundamental due process. 9
4. Detention for Longer than Two Weeks without a Full
Hearing on the Necessity for Commitment is Unconstitutional.
Mrs. Lessard was held for 26 days prior to the hearing upon which
her commitment was based. The court found this period to be so
45. Id. at 44. In Gault the Supreme Court stated: "in light of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), we must also consider whether, if the privilege against self-incrimination
is available it can effectively be waived unless counsel is presented or the right to counsel
has been waived."
46. 347 F. Supp. at 1091.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Ample authority in the criminal area regarding pre-arraignment confinement could
have been cited to put this holding on more solid ground. For example, in Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he duty enjoined upon
arresting officers to arraign 'without unnecessary delay' [Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., Rule 5(a)]
indicates the command does not call for mechanical or automatic obedience. Circumstances
may justify a brief delay between arrest and arraignment..., such as the need to quickly
verify the accused's story with a third party. 354 U.S. at 455. The test the Seventh Circuit
uses for pre-arraignment detentions was also available to the Lessard court. In United
States v. Taylor, 374 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1967), the standard was formulated as a determina-
tion of whether the delay between arrest and arraignment was unnecessary upon a consider-
ation of the "sum total of circumstances" (at 757). See also United States v. Hamilton,
409 F.2d 404, 406 (7th Cir. 1969).
50. 349 F. Supp. at 1098.
[Vol. 57
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long as to be offensive to due process, and set up its own limit of
ten to fourteen days. The court finds no "reason why psychiatrists
cannot be scheduled to make their examinations within two or
three days of the patient's entering the hospital," 5' but then pro-
ceeds to permit ten to fourteen days of pre-hearing detention.
It appears that the ten to fourteen day limit established by the
court is purely an arbitrary one. If the purpose of the confinement
is for examination only, then it should be permitted only so long
as such examination requires. If, as the court suggests, the pre-trial
detention period exists also "for the patient to prepare any de-
fense,'5 2 it is nowhere evident that this purpose is served by a
shorter period of detention followed by an immediate hearing. The
opposite may be the case since a longer pre-hearing period without
continued detention would probably enable the patient to prepare
a more adequate defense.53
5. The Right to Counsel Applies to Civil Commitment
Proceedings. The court finds that the Wisconsin civil commitment
procedure is constitutionally defective because it "permits commit-
ment based upon a hearing in which the person charged with men-
tal illness is not represented by adversary counsel." 4 The court
stands on firm ground in relying upon Heryford v. Parker,5 which
in turn relies on In re Gault" for authority. The crucial factor for
all three courts-Gault, Heryford, and Lessard is: "the liklihood
of involuntary incarceration-whether for punishment as an adult
for a crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treat-
ment and training as a feeble-minded mental incompetent." 57 Any
such incarceration "commands the observance of the constitu-
tional safeguards of due process." 8 All three courts conclude that
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. A similar contradiction is made evident, by n. 22, 349 F. Supp. at 1092. Dr. David
J. Vail, Medical Director, Department of Public Welfare, State of Minnesota, 1970 Hear-
ings at 72, has found that if you are pleading insanity as a defense for a crime, you can be
assured that you will receive a thorough medical examination. On the other hand, if you
are an ordinary citizen, and are simply trying to keep from being civilly committed, you
will be fortunate to have a 15-minute interview with two general practitioners.
54. 349 F. Supp. at 1103. Lessard, in addition, held that counsel must be appointed
"with time enough before [the] hearing to prepare any initial defenses which may be avail-
able." Otherwise, the right to representation by counsel would be a mere formality. Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 563 (1966).
55. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
56. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
57. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d at 396.
58. Id.
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the right to counsel is fundamental among these constitutional
safeguards. s9
The more specific issue in the Lessard case, however, is whether
the Wisconsin provision for a guardian ad litem which is appointed
in the court's discretion fulfills the constitutional requirement. The
court concludes that the appointment of a guardian ad litem serves
a function different from that of adversary counsel, and therefore
does not displace that requirement." The court looked into the role
played by the individual plaintiff's guardian ad litem in Lessard
and also at a recent study of the Wisconsin civil commitment
procedure."' The study revealed that the guardian ad litem concev-
ied his role to be that of a traditional guardian who makes indepen-
dent decisions about what is best for the "client-ward" rather than
as an advocate who presses for his client's interests as perceived
by the client. 2 Indeed, if the guardian ad litem is permitted to
exercise his independent judgment, and he feels that the individual
is in need of confined treatment, the individual who wishes to
seriously contest commitment is without representation. The court
correctly concludes that the role served by the guardian ad litem
in Wisconsin civil commitment procedures does not satisfy the
constitutional right to counsel.6 3
6. Hearsay Evidence Cannot Be Admitted in Civil Commit-
ment Proceedings. A relatively minor issue among the nine consid-
ered by the court is that of hearsay evidence. The exclusion of
hearsay evidence was not seriously disputed by the state.64 The
court again relies on In re Gault,65 which, while not called upon to
59. 349 F. Supp. at 1097. See also Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRIM.
L. BULL. 101, 125 (1971). The court in Lessard v. Schmidt, could have treated this issue
more summarily. For example, in a similar decision, the New York Court of Appeals in
Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636 (1966), made its memorandum decision
on purely constitutional grounds. The court stated: "in our view, the principle of Baxstrom
v. Herold, Gideon v. Wainwright, Douglas v. California, Lane v. Brown, Griffin v. Illinois,
and of similar cases, demonstrates that an indigent mental patient, who is committed to an
institution, is entitled, in a habeas corpus proceeding . , to the assignment of counsel
as a matter of constitutional right." Id. at 256.
60. Id. at 1099.
61. Dix, supra, note 7, at I.
62. Id. at 33.
63. 349 F. Supp. at 1099. What the court fails to do is to spell out or even suggest the
proper role of the guardian ad litem in the commitment process when counsel is afforded.
For a general discussion of guardians ad litm in Wisconsin, see Hohmann & Dwyer,
Guardians ad litem in Wisconsin, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 455 (1965).
64. Id. at 1102.
65. 387 U.S. 1.
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decide the hearsay issue, indicated that the informality of the juve-
nile proceeding did not justify the admission of hearsay." The
court compares the juvenile and mental commitment procedures,
and finds no meaningful distinction between the two proceedings
with regard to hearsay. 7 Again noting the seriousness of the depri-
vation of liberty involved, the court reasonably concluded that
"where standard exclusionary rules forbid the admission, no sound
policy reasons exist for admitting [hearsay] evidence in an involun-
tary commitment hearing."6
7. If Psychiatric Evidence is to be Presented, the Patient must
be Given the Benefit of the Privilege against Self-Incrimination.
Self-incrimination is one of the most troublesome issues in the civil
commitment area. Although this and other courts have logically
rejected the civil-criminal distinction for purposes of self-
incrimination," it has also been recognized that the price of a
lawyer's advice to his client not to make statements to a psychia-
trist may be to prevent needed treatment. 7 Although a psychiatric
examination resembles a police interrogation in its potential loss-
of-liberty result, it is difficult to envision an effective psychiatric
examination that takes place in the presence of adversary counsel.
The difficulty in balancing the state's (and indeed, possibly the
patient's) interest in a confidential uninterrupted psychiatric inter-
view, and the accused's interest in due process, is recognized by the
court, which attempts to reconcile these competing considerations.
The court states:
Wisconsin may not, consistent with basic concepts of due pro-
cess, commit individuals on the basis of a showing that the state-
ments were made with "knowledge" that the individual was not
allowed to speak. We do think, however, that the safeguards of
the privilege may be obtained without the presence of counsel in
the psychiatric interview. The patient should be told by counsel
and the psychiatrist that he is going to be examined with regard
to his mental condition, that the statements he may make may
be the basis for commitment, and that he does not have to speak
to the psychiatrist. Having been informed of this danger the
patient may be examined if he willingly assents."
66. See 349 F. Supp. at 1102, quoting from Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police,
State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REv. 775, 794-795 (1966).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1103.
69. Id. at 1100-1101; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 49.
70. Id. at 101.
71. Id.
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The court neglects, however, to give any indication of when notice
of the right must be given, or whether it must be repeated prior to
each psychiatric interview.72
8. Commitment Without Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
that the Patient is Both "Mentally Ill" and "Dangerous" is Uncon-
stitutional. The traditional civil-criminal distinction regarding bur-
den of proof was clearly eroded with regard to juvenile delinquency
procedures by In re Winship . 3 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court held that all facts needed to prove juvenile delin-
quency had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, because of
possible loss of liberty and the stigmatizing effect of a conviction.74
The Lessard court found the considerations that formed the basis
for the Winship holding even more persuasive in the mental com-
mitment area. Not only does the individual lose liberty and become
stigmatized, but he loses civil rights as well. 75 The court therefore
held that "the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all facts
necessary to show that an individual is both mentally ill and dan-
gerous."76
The dangerousness requirement stems from the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 51.02(5), Wis. Stats.,77
in Humphrey v. Cady.78 That case read into the state's definition
of mental illness the requirement that a person's "potential for
doing harm, to himself or others, is great enough to justify . . . a
massive curtailment of liberty. '79
Humphrey interpreted the statute to require "dangerousness";
however, it did not consider whether such a requirement may be
constitutionally compelled. The Lessard court suggests that a stat-
ute which does not require a finding of dangerousness would be
defective, although it did not phrase its discussion in constitutional
terms.8" The court compares the physically ill with the mentally ill,
72. The same conditions should be present for the warning of legal rights in a mental
commitment case as were present in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and therefore
the warning should be given before each psychiatric interview.
73. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
74. 349 F. Supp. at 1095; see also 397 U.S. at 365-366.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. WIs. STAT. § 51.02(5)(c) (1971) provides that the court may "order [the patient]
committed if he is satisfied that he is mentally ill or infirm or deficient and that he is a
proper subject for custody and treatment."
78. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
79. Id. at 509.
80. 349 F. Supp. at 1094.
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and notes that the physically ill are free to reject treatment. The
court then states that those who are mentally ill should have the
same choice unless 1) dangerousness is proven or 2) the patient's
inability ot make a decision is proven." This, in essence, is an equal
protection argument, which could have been stated as follows:
Non-dangerous mentally ill persons and physically ill persons
constitute similarly situated classes. To require one group (the
mentally ill) to undergo involuntary treatment while not requir-
ing the other group (the physically ill) to undergo such treatment
is a denial of equal protection to the mentally ill class.
Applying this traditional equal protection analysis, the state would
thus have to show that the state has a legitimate interest in achiev-
ing a certain level of mental health while it does not have to achieve
the same level of physical health.
9. Involuntary Civil Commitment Without Consideration of
Less Restrictive Alternatives is Unconstitutional. The Lessard
court finds that: "[plersons suffering from the condition of being
mentally ill, but who are not alleged to have commited any crime,
cannot be totally deprived of their liberty if there are less drastic
means for achieving the same basic goal."8" The philosophy of the
court is that full-time involuntary commitment should be turned
to only as a last resort.8 3 Relying upon Lake v. Cameron," the
court holds that the party seeking full-time involuntary hospitaliza-
tion must bear the burden of proving "(1) what alternatives are
available; (2) what alternatives were investigated; and (3) why the
investigated alternatives were not deemed suitable."8"
Here again the court flirts with the application of a compelling
state interest test, by holding that the burden shifts to the party
seeking commitment to show that less restrictive alternatives were
not feasible. However, the court simply shifts the burden to the
"person"86 recommending hospitalization. There is no indication
whether such person is equated with the "state".
Further, the court does not find the statute 7 constitutionally
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1096.
83. Id. at 1095.
84. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 101 (1971), in which this
issue is discussed in light of Lake v. Cameron.
85. 349 F. Supp. at 1096.
86. Id.
87. Wis. STAT. § 51.05 (1971) only states that "if the court or jury finds that the patient
is mentally ill or infirm and should be sent to a hospital for the mentally ill or infirm, the
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defective here, because the standard could have been applied con-
sistently with the statute's discretionary mandate to the judge re-
garding commitment. The court merely found that the procedure
followed for the commitment of Alberta Lessard was constitution-
ally defective because thejudge failed to consider alternative meth-
ods.18
D. Summary
Henceforth, the present Wisconsin civil commitment statutes
cannot be enforced to the extent that they conflict with the conclu-
sions of the Lessard court. Lawyers, legislators, and judges should
now be aware that in Wisconsin the following dictates must be
respected; Wisconsin must now: (1) afford a right to counsel to
those "accused" of mental illness; (2) hold a preliminary hearing
on probable cause within 48 hours; (3) hold a full adversary hearing
within 2 weeks of the accused's confinement; (4) serve the accused
with notice of all hearings and all rights including the right to a
jury trial; (5) afford the accused the privilege against self-
incrimination; (6) exclude hearsay evidence; (7) commit only upon
proof of dangerousness and mental illness beyond a reasonable
doubt; and (8) investigate alternatives before resorting to full time
involuntary commitment.8
It should be noted that all of the above requirements, with the
possible exception of the last, affect only the procedure used in
committing those alleged to be mentally ill. Although a few of the
court's conclusions should profoundly affect fundamental constitu-
tional rights, especially the self-incrimination privilege and the rea-
sonable doubt standard, the major thrust of the decision merely
fortifies requirements that already exist in fact or in law. For
example, notice requirements are found to be somewhat stricter
than those existing under the present statute. Hearsay is now abol-
sutely excluded instead of being within the judge's discretion. Ap-
pointed counsel is now required.
In light of In re Gault,"0 none of the conclusions is especially
shocking, nor is it likely that Wisconsin will experience much long-
term difficulty in adapting to the new procedurel safeguards. With
court shall commit him to a hospital. See also Wis. STAT. § 51.02(5)(c) (1971), quoted
in n. 77.
88. For further discussion of the court's decision requiring the search for alternatives,
see nn. 181-191.
89. 349 F. Supp. at 1103.
90. 387 U.S. 1.
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the growing disintegration of the civil-criminal distinction in the
area of due process rights, it seems surprising that it took so long
for the status of those accused of mental illness to be elevated to
that accorded juveniles in delinquency proceedings.
III. THE FUTURE AND UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS
Wisconsin has a dual system of mental health facilities; one at
the county level,9" and the other at the state level.9" County hospi-
tals, because of lack of facilities, except in Milwaukee County,
have been primarily custodial and have been utilized either for
chronic cases or for institutionalization of the aged. The state insti-
tutions, and especially Mendota State Hospital and Winnebago
State Hospital, have been the primary treatment facilities .
3
Within the state of Wisconsin, the disparities among counties
is great. Among the state's seventy-two counties, only about one-
half (thirty-five) have local county institutions.94 These institutions
are situated in the more populous, and generally richer, counties.
For instance, none of the counties with under 10,000 residents
(Adams, Burnett, Florence, Forest, Iron, Marquette, Menominee,
Pepin, and Sawyer), have local mental health facilities. 5 On the
other hand, the state's two most populous counties (Milwaukee
and Dane) have excellent facilities, including out-patient treatment
centers, half-way houses, psychiatric counseling centers, and sev-
eral other alternative treatment facilities." Many of Wisconsin's
counties literally have no trained psychiatrists living within their
confines, whereas others have a wealth of psychiatric personnel. 7
91. WIs. STAT. § 51.25 (1971) states that "any county having a population of less than
500,000 may establish a hospital or facilities for the detention and care of mentally ill
persons . Notably absent from this statute is "for the treatment of mentally ill per-
sons."
Counties in Wisconsin with mental health institutions are Brown, Chippewa, Clark,
Columbia, Dane, Dodge, Douglas, Dunn, Eau Claire, Fond du Lac, Grant, Green, Iowa,
Jefferson, La Crosse, Manitowoc, Marathon, Marinette, Monroe, Outagamie, Racine,
Rock, St. Croix, Sauk, Shawano, Sheboygan, Trempealeau, Vernon, Walworth, Washing-
ton, Waukesha, Waupaca, Winnebago, and Wood.
92. WIs. STAT. § 51.15 (1971) provides for two hospitals for the mentally ill known as
Mendota State Hospital and Winnebago State Hospital. In addition, see Wis. STAT.
§ 51.21 (197 1) for the provision concerning the establishment of Central State Hospital; and
WIS. STAT. § 51.22 (1971) for the establishment of state colonies and training schools.
93. Dix, supra note 7.
94. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, supra, note 26.
95. Wisconsin Public Health Statistics, Division of Health, Department of Health and
Social Services (1971), at 8-9.
96. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, supra, note 26.
97. Biographical Dirctory, American Psychiatric Associaton (1970). See Geographical
index.
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Since the decision of Lessard v. Schmit enunciates procedures
that are to apply to the whole state of Wisconsin, and these proce-
dures are to be implemented primarily at the county court level,
some counties will have more difficulties than others in respecting
the decision. Some of the lesser populated counties which have no
local treatment facilities, no half-way houses, no out-patient men-
tal care units, will not have many "less restrictive" alternatives
available for investigation. At the very least, they may be required
to investigate treatment alternatives that exist in surrounding
counties.98 Some counties, because of a lack of judicial resources,
may encounter difficulties in holding a preliminary hearing on
probable cause within 48 hours, as has been the case concerning
the requirement of a speedy arraignment in the criminal area.99
This question is likely to arise if the patient is confined on a Friday
evening or during a holiday week-end. Likewise, some counties will
have more difficulty than others in complying with the requirement
that the prospective patient be notified ahead of time of the names
of the examining physicians.
Due to the nature of the decision in Lessard v. Schmidt, all
counties, and all legal authorities, judges, district attorneys, and
lawyers alike, must be held to the standards laid down. The deci-
sion effectively obliterated a major portion of the Wisconsin civil
commitment statute. It did so because the due process clause of
the Constitution of the United States dictated this. It did so be-
cause the three-judge court believed that this result was required
by man's natural compassion for his fellow man, especially those
who are stricken with disease. As Judge Sprecher emphasized,
using a quote from John Stuart Mill early in his decision, the court
did so because of our basic feelings about freedom. Mill stated:
98. WIs. STAT. § 51.437(1) (1971) does not presently require counties with few facilities
to investigate treatment alternatives which may exist in surrounding counties, it only advises
them to combine their energies and resources with other counties to develop joint services.
In an attempt ". . . to insure the delivery of needed services and the prevention of unneces-
sary duplication, fragmentation of services and waste of resources" (§ 51.437(1)(a) 1),
"[aldjacent counties, lacking the financial resources and professional personnel needed to
provide or secure such services on a single-county basis, may and shall be encouraged to
combine their energies and financial resources to provide these joint services and facilities
.(§ 51.437(1)).
99. See note 49 supra, for a prior discussion of this. But also see United States v.
Gorman, 36 F.R.D. 416, 420 (D.C. Conn. 1965), where it was stated that for pre-
arraignment detention "[c]ircumstances may justify a delay of over forty-eight hours, as in
United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 567 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 891 . . ."
The Gorman court stated that delays of such length could be justified if the purpose was
investigatory, or where no committing magistrate was available.
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The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursu-
ing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt
to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.
Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily,
or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering
each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compel-
ling each to live as seems good to the rest."' [Emphasis added]
The ultimate duty of implementing a judicial decision invaira-
bly falls on the shoulders of lawyers. Lawyers, especially those of
Wisconsin, should become aware of the Lessard decision. They
should attempt to understand it and the bases on which it stands.
They should use it to both protect the rights of those clients who
are involuntarily subjected to civil commitment procedures and to
facilitate the treatment of those clients who are truly suffering
from mental illness. Thus, a discussion introducing some of the
substantive and procedural issues not resolved by Lessard is in
order. This discussion will attempt to raise, but not exhaustively
discuss, such substantive issues as the right to involuntarily commit
an individual who has not committed a crime; the right to treat-
ment; civil commitment as an adversary proceeding; the role of the
attorney in commitment proceedings; the role of the guardian ad
litem; the scope of the hearing required by Lessard; and the search
for alternatives. An understanding of these issue areas is necessary
for a successful implementation of the decision of Lessard v.
Schmidt, and for the welfare of all the individuals who have been
or will be involuntarily committed in Wisconsin mental institu-
tions. An understanding of all of these issues will also be necessary
to critically examine and analyze the new statute that the state
legislature will pass to replace those aspects of the Wisconsin Men-
tal Health Act which Lessard v. Schmidt ruled unconstitutional. 1'
A. Substantive Questions Concerning Civil Commitment
The requirement that less drastic alternatives be considered
before commitment is ordered reaches beyond procedural limita-
tions and approaches the basic substantive question of when and
what type of involuntary medical treatment is justified. The
Lessard court neither confronts the question of the constitution-
ality of involuntary commitment, nor does it resolve the confines
100. 349 F. Supp. at 1084, quoting from J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY, 18 (Gateway ed. 1962).
101. See supra note 30.
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of the right to treatment.'"' As the United States Supreme Court
recently declared in Jackson v. Indiana"3 that "[c]onsidering the
number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the sub-
stantive constitutional limitations on this power have not been
more frequently litigated." ' 4 Mr. Justice Blackmun, however, dis-
posed of his observation by stating that "[w]e need not address
these broad questions here." ' ° The reader is left holding an empty
bag. He is provided only with references to Robinson v.
California'° and Powell v. Texas, 07 two cases confronting the
broad constitutional issues presented by status crimes. Whatever
may have been the motive of the Supreme Court in Jackson in
avoiding the substantive issues, the reader is made aware of the
presence of serious questions which remain unanswered. Is invol-
untary civil commitment unconstitutional per se? If such commit-
ment is not unconstitutional, is it conditioned on a subsequent right
to treatment?
Involuntary civil commitment has never been held to be uncon-
stitutional per se. In the past, it has been justified on two legal
grounds, seldom distinguished from each other. The first is the
lofty notion of parens patriae which entails the right of the state
to commit individuals so mentally disordered as to be incapable of
deciding how and when to seek treatment. In this instance, the
state was thought to be acting in the best interests of the individ-
ual. 10 The second justification for civil commitment was society's
right to preventatively detain an individual because of society's
need to protect itself from potential irrational acts by persons who
were adjudged as "dangerous".' The latter rationale has tradi-
102. 349 F. Supp. at 1086.
103. 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972).
104. Id.
105. Id. In Lessard the court stated that "[t]he issue of a constitutional right to treat-
ment is not before us." (349 F. Supp. at 1086).
106. 370 U.S. 660 (1961). In Robinson the Supreme Court invalidated a California
statute making it a criminal offense to "be addicted to the use of narcotics" as being
contrary to the eighth amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
107. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). In Powell the Supreme Court failed to extend Robinson v.
California to bar the conviction of a chronic alcoholic for drunkness. In a 5 to 4 decision,
the majority, in affirming the conviction, generally rejected the eighth amendment defense
in alcoholism cases. For an excellent discussion of Robinson and Powell and their effect on
the treatment of alcoholics, see Comment, "Alcoholism Treatment in Wisconsin: The Need
for Legislative Reform", 1973 Wis. L. REV. 133, 140-144.
108. 349 F. Supp. at 1084-1086.
109. Id. at 1084. See also Comment, "Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to
Treatment," 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
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tionally been regarded as tenuous. To restrain an individual who
has not commited a crime is bad enough, but to restrain him for
some vague reason like the protection of society, in a punitive
fashion; is worse. The former rationale, parens patriae, is easier to
accept. Being essentially paternalistic, it proceeds from the theory
that the restraint is for treatment. The focus is on trying to act for
the benefit of the patient; and on treating the patient as it is as-
sumed he would treat himself if he were not mentally ill.110
For this reason, civil commitment statutes, and the judicial
decisions construing them, have generally stressed the treatment
aspect of such confinement."' The real picture, however, has shown
that the treatment afforded those who have been commited as
being mentally ill has not corresponded with the wording of the
statutes and judicial pronouncements."'
Although it must be admitted that the institutional treatment
of the mentally ill is in the process of radical change, many mental
institutions are dangerously understaffed and severely over-
crowded."' Institutionalized treatment of the mentally ill is a dif-
ficult proposition no matter what the situation. Until the present
day, mental hospitals have had difficulty attracting trained psychi-
atrists, who often earn higher incomes and are more stimulated by
private practice. Treatment of the mentally ill has become increas-
ingly expensive. 14 Far down the list of financial concerns compet-
ing for state money, treatment of the mentally ill has not been
adequately funded. The institutions themselves have been clogged
110. The chain of cases from Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), to McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), show the changing fortunes of parenspatriae, which
is being treated to a renaissance by the Burger Court after having suffered serious attack
during the Warren years.
11l. See generally Note, "The Nascent Right to Treatment," 53 VA. L. REV. 1134
(1967). See also Wis. STAT. § 51.001(3) (1971), which states that the "state hospitals" shall
have "the purpose of providing diagnosis, care or treatment, for mental or emotional
disturbance or mental deficiency." And Wis. STAT. § 51.005 (1971) which states that "[ilt
is the purpose of this chapter [51] to provide for care and treatment in state and county
hospitals for persons who by reason of mental illness, infirmity or deficiency are in need of
care and treatment not feasible in their own homes or in private facilities."
112. There is a wealth of literature critical of American mental hospitals. See, for
example, Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health, Action for Mental Health: Final
Report 3-23 (1961); and Bloomberg, A Proposal for a Community-based Hospital as a
Branch of a State Hospital, 116 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 814 (1960).
113. Comment, supra, note 108 at 88. Milwaukee Journal, July 22, 1973, at 1, part 2,
col. 4.
114. Keeping a patient at South Division County Hospital, Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
costs about $810 a month.
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by "custodial" cases (such as senile patients) who could be better
treated and cared for in nursing homes.
The net result has been that in many instances those committed
to mental hospitals are often not treated." 5 This recently came
under the scrutiny of judicial eyes. In Rouse v. Cameron,"8 Judge
Bazelon suggested that "[i]ndefinite confinement without treat-
ment of one who has been found not criminally responsible may
be so inhumane as to be 'cruel and unusual punishment.' 117 In his
opinion, there exist two principal constitutional attacks on confine-
ment without treatment. First, he suggested that commitment on
the basis of "dangerousness" was to be allowed, but only if proce-
dural guarantees like those provided in the criminal process, were
respected. This is essentially the same approach as that used by the
court in Lessard. The second constitutional attack is that commit-
ment without treatment may be so inhumane as to fall within the
scope of the eighth amendment's protection against cruel and unu-
sual punishment.11 8 The Lessard court was aware of this issue, but
did not have to decide it."'
The basis for constitutionally attacking commitment without
treatment as being cruel and unusual punishment is the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. California."' Cali-
115. See Bloomberg, supra, note 11, who has suggested that the effects of institutinal-
izaton of the mentally ill are so severe that if an individual is confined for over two years,
the chances are very great that he will die in the hospital. In Lessard, the court states that
"[p]erhaps the most serious possible effect of a decision to commit an individual lies in the
statistics which indicate that an individual committed to a mental institution has a much
greater chance of dying than if he were left at large." 349 F. Supp. at 1089, citing Furman
& Conners, Jr., The Pennsylvania Experiment in Due Process, 8 DUQUESNE L. REv. 32,
65-66 (1970).
116. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Rouse brought forth numerous comments on the
right to treatment. Comment, Due Process for All: Constitutional Standards for Involun-
tary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U.CFt. L. REv. 633; Note, supra, note 110; 16 AM.
U.L. REv. 307 (1967); Note, supra note 108. Judge Bazelon responded to several of these
articles in Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHIi. L. REv. 742 (1969).
117. Id. at 453.
118. Id.
119. 349 F. Supp. at 1086; the court quoting from note 110, at 1140.
120. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). For an interesting decision in which the Federal District
Court held that conditions and practices in the Arkansas petentiary system, including the
trustee system whereby trustees ran the prison, inhumane conditions in isolation cells, and
the absence of meaningful rehabilitation programs, were such as to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment, see Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). The court's
treatment of the definitional problems of what constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment"
is doubly interesting. After stating that cruel and unusual punishment cannot be defined
with any specifity, the court states that "[iut is flexible and tends to broaden as society tends
to pay more regard to human decency and dignity and becomes, or likes to think it becomes,
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fornia had passed a law making it a crime to be addicted to narcot-
ics. The Court, in ruling the statute unconstitutional, emphasized
that it did not provide or require medical "treatment". Rather, it
simply made the "status" of addiction to narcotics a criminal of-
fense. The Court compared this to making leprosy or syphilis a
criminal offense, and held that to make such a disease a criminal
offense would be contrary to the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments.' In dicta, the Court added an important caveat: "[A] state
might determine that the general health and welfare require that
the victims of these and other human afflictions be dealt with by
compulsory treatment .... ,,2 Hence, the Court imposed an im-
portant limitation on civil commitment; that it be accompanied by
treatment.
The Robinson dictum has not hardened into solid constitu-
tional principle. The fact that some mentally ill individuals are
considered untreatable has made commentators hesitant to pro-
nounce that Robinson requires that these people be set free.123 On
the other hand, the courts have been unwilling to find that there is
no constitutional right to treatment, thus at least rationalizing the
involuntary detention and confinement of those insane individuals
who are untreatable. 2 4
The courts have been noticeably more willing to treat this
whole area from the point of view of equal protection. They do not
consider substantive issues, in what one commentator calls "avoid-
ance of more difficult issues via the modestly interventionist equal
protection route."''  Examples of this are Jackson v. Indiana,128
and Humphrey v. Cady.121 In Jackson the Supreme Court empha-
sized the temporary nature of the incompetency-to-stand-trial
commitment. The Court held that "a person charged by a state
with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his
incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reason-
able period of time necessary to determine whether there is a sub-
more humane." This indicates that, assuming society is paying more attention to human
rights and dignity, the confines of cruel and unusual punishment are accordingly growing
larger and larger.
121. 370 U.S. at 666.
122. Id.
123. Comment, supra, note 108 at 98.
124. Id. at 99.
125. Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 26 (1972).
126. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
127. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
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stantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseea-
ble future."' 8 The basis for the decision in Jackson was the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The equal protec-
tion violation was isolated by comparing the procedures applicable
to commitment of those charged with criminal offenses and those
for persons not charged with offenses. The Court found that crimi-
nal defendants were subject both to more lenient commitment stan-
dards and to more severe standards of release. 2 1 In Humphrey v.
Cady3" the petitioner challenged the commitment procedures
under the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act.' The Supreme Court, in
finding that a jury determination preceded commitment under the
Mental Health Act and not under the Sex Crimes Act, ruled that
equal protection was sufficiently challenged as to warrant an evi-
dentiary hearing on remand.'
The future of this area of the law is difficult to predict. Present
judicial activity can be characterized as either being in avoidance
of the major substantive issues, or as being an effort to tighten-up
the procedures utilized in this area to correspond to those used in
the criminal area. One can only guess at how the courts will decide
if the substantive issue before them cannot be avoided or decided
on procedural grounds.
B. Involuntary Civil Commitment as Adversary Proceeding
The court in Lessard v. Schmidt emphasizes the need of repre-
setative counsel for those who wish to contest commitment. 33
The court assumes that the role the attorney plays goes beyond
that of the guardian ad litem (who tends to proceed in the best
interests of the client and not according to the client's will), to that
of adversary counsel. 34 Elemental to the court's decision is the
belief that civil commitment procedures should be governed by the
adversary system.
128. 406 U.S. 738.
129. Id. at 723-730.
130. 405 U.S. 504.
131. WIs. STAT. § 959.15 (1958), as amended, Wis. LAWS ch. 975 (1971).
132. 405 U.S. at 508-512. See also State ex rel. Matalik v. Schubert, 57 Wis. 2d 315
(1972), in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied heavily on Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715 (1972), in reaching its decision. The Wisconsin Court, however, found no equal
protection violation because of the absence of a jury determination under the criminal
section (WIs. STAT. § 971.14 (1971)), and provision for it under the civil commitment
provision (Wis. STAT. § 51.03 (1971)).
133. 349 F. Supp. at 1099, citing Gupta, New York's Mental Health Information
Service: An Experiment in Due Process, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 405, 438 (1971).
134. 349 F. Supp. at 1099.
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In this context, it must be noted that the adversary system is
central to the administration of criminal justice. It is the result of
both the evolution from trial by combat and the belief in a non-
violent forum for argument and presentation of evidence. 13 The
efficient functioning of the adversary system depends on challenge
and a constant searching and a creative questioning of all official
decisions and assertions of authority at every stage of the judicial
process.13 1 In the middle of the system sits the judge. The require-
ment that the judge remain neutral reflects the belief that the
parties acting in an adversary context are more likely to accept the
decision of a neutral and detached magistrate than a judge who
favored one side over the other. 37 The corollary to the principle
that the tribunal remain neutral and not take the initiative in devel-
oping the case, is that the judge insure that the opportunity to
present evidence and information relevant to the issue remain open
to each side.'
Relating to civil commitment procedures, the theory that the
adversary system is capable of determining the facts and facilitat-
ing a decision on mental competency must be closely examined. 3,
Assumed in that decision is that the participants in the sys-
tem-counsel, judge, jury, witnesses, and medical experts-will
assume their assigned positions. In reality, as one commentator
has stated: ". . . the nature of the issues involved often causes the
participants either to misconceive their roles or to reject them
entirely."' 4 For example, the attorney is the professional repre-
sentative of the "accused"; he is not his alter ego.' It is his duty
to do what is legally in the best interests of his client. Sometimes,
however, the legal interest of the client does not correspond with
his medical interest. What does the attorney do then? Medical
experts often are called upon to give independent opinions to the
court. Since by its very nature psychiatry is an uncertain field,
135. ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function 2
Approved Draft, 1971.
136. Report of the Atty. Gen.'s Committee On Poverty and the Administration of
Federal Criminal Justice 11 (1963).
137. Prosecution Function and the Defense Function, supra, note 135 at 4.
138. Id.
139. For an excellent discussion of this same issue as it relates to juvenile procedures,
see Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problem of Function and
Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7.
140. Chernoff & Schaffer, Defending the Mentally Ill1 Ethical Quicksand, 10 AM. Cims.
L. REV. 505, 509 (1972).
141. Prosecution Function and the Defense Function, supra, note 135, at § 1.1(c).
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there is generally room for differences of opinion on either side of
any given question.' Hence, medical experts are often put into the
position of acting as advocates for whichever side retains them,
and the proceeding may become a "battle of psychiatric ex-
perts".' It is common for psychiatrists not to understand the
adversary system. Many of them, in fact, become very perturbed
by what they feel are unnecessary legal restraints, such as the
hearsay rule.'44 Since jurors are generally unsophisticated in the
science of psychiatry and its terms, it becomes exceedingly difficult
for them to receive, evaluate, and resolve the contradictory and
conflicting testimony of medical experts.145 And what role is the
judge to play? Should he simply assume the role of neutral and
detached magistrate that the adversary system requires of him? Or
should he reach out from his neutrality, and at the very least,
assume a more active role by initiating inquires, aiding the search
for alternative treatment facilities, and insuring that the patient is
to receive the most advantageous and beneficial treatment avail-
able?' In the midst of the confusion concerning the roles that
attorneys, medical experts, guardians ad litem, and jurors, are to
play in the system, it would seem wise to expect the judge to
become an active director of all the participants in the system. For
142. See Chernoff, supra, note 140, at 509. See also generally Roberts, Some Observa-
tions on the Problems of the Forensic Psychiatrist, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 240.
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter so masterfully understated in Greenwood v. United States,
350 U.S. 266, 275 (1956): "The only certain thing that can be said about the present state
of knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not reached formality
of judgment..." This statement still applies today.
143. Henry H. Foster, Director of the Law-Psychiatry Project, New York University,
reacts to the fact that psychiatrists can often testify on both sides of an issue when it
concerns human motivation, by stating:
"Humility seems to be called for if we start with the premise that both law and
psychiatry are concerned with motivation and human behavior, and that informed
guesses rather than absolutes are the stocks in trade. . . . If only because of the
phenomenon of projection, it is difficult if not impossible to achieve certitude when
we deal with motivation and human behavior. No matter how objective we try to be
we cannot escape our own subjectivity."
Foster, What Psychiatrists Should Know About the Limitatons of Law, 1965 Wis. L. REv.
189, 190.
144. Roberts, supra, note 142, at 255.
145. See Judge Bazelon's concurring opinion in United States v. Leazer, 460 F.2d 864
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Bazelon has also held that psychiatrists should avoid the use of technical
language. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
146. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657. Bazelon, in his opinion here, implies that the
court is to take an active role in these procedures. Note especially Chief Justice Warren
Burger's overt disagreement, with Bazelon's feelings, in his dissenting opinion. 364 F.2d at
664.
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example, when it comes to the "facts" of the case, the judge must
make clear to all parties the likely difference in agreement between
the legal and psychiatric points of view. He should insure that
technical terms are used as little as possible, and that the medical
testimony is not conclusory.'47 As concerns the search for alterna-
tives, the judge (especially at the county level, where he knows his
county well) should be in an advantageous position to seek out the
optimal methods of treatment.
Accordingly, the judge might have to assume a more active role
than that required by the adversary process, especially if the right
to treatment is recognized and the requirement that alternatives be
investigated is enforced. In this context, two further questions
arise. What happens to the guardian ad litem, in light of the deci-
sion in Lessard that he does not satisfy the constitutional right to
counsel?148 And what role is the attorney to play in these
proceedings?
Lessard finds the guardian ad litem constitutionally inadequate
as counsel, but does not hold that the appointment of a guardian
is legally inadmissable per se.49 In the adversary system, it is clear
that the lawyer speaks as the patient's defense counsel. The guard-
ian ad litem, on the other hand, evaluates what he considers to be
the "best interests of the client-ward" ' and then proceeds, possi-
bly independent from the will of his client-ward, to accomplish
this.' Under such circumstances, would it not be possible for the
guardian ad litem to act as an intermediary between the patient
and his attorney-directing the legal representation because the
patient is presumed to be incapable? If the patient is indeed in a
mentally confused state, whether or not his condition merits com-
mitment, a guardian ad litem may serve a useful, if not indispensa-
ble role in protecting the rights of his client-ward. He may prevent
147. Judge Bazelon does not fear that scientific expertise will overwhelm the court. He
states,concerning the right to treatment of mental illness, that "[t]he Cassandras that fore-
see judges wallowing hopelessly in the bogs of psychiatry seldom distinguish the problems
of enforcing a right to treatment from those encountered whenever courts deal with compli-
cated questions of science and technology", such as railroad rates, airplane design, and dam-
building. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 743
(1969).
148. 349 F. Supp. at 1099. Wis. STAT. § 51.02(4) (1971) states: "At any stage of the
proceedings, the court may, if it determines that the best interest of the patient requires it,
appoint a guardian ad litem for him."
149. 349 F. Supp. at 1099.
150. Id. For a general discussion of guardians ad litem in Wisconsin, see Hohmann &
Dwyer, Guardians ad litem in Wisconsin, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 445 (1965).
151. 349 F. Supp. at 1099.
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a patient from unwisely waiving counsel15 or may press for a con-
test when the patient is unable to make that decision. He may also
take an active role in looking for and analyzing the alternatives
available for treatment of the patient.
One must be careful not to assume that the appointment of a
guardian ad litem means that the "accused" is of unsound mind,
which is the very issue that remains in question until a full adver-
sary hearing has been held. In the analogous juvenile setting, mi-
nors are legally incompetent, and assumed to need state protection
because of their age.1 3 The need for protection stems from the fact
of their youth, which is not in question; but not from an assump-
tion of delinquency, which is. However, in the mental commitment
setting, confusion is often caused by the fact that justification for
a guardian ad litem appears to involve the disputed question of
mental competence.
It is also important to analyze the role of the attorney in these
proceedings. Several pertinent questions arise. First, now that the
civil-criminal distinctions have disappeared concerning most pro-
cedural due process rights, would it be wise for the attorney to
advise his client to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination
and remain totally silent? The fifth amendment states that "No
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. . . " Lessard made it explicit that this constitu-
tional protection applies to civil commitment procedures.5 , The
court, however, failed to explore the possibility that a patient hav-
ing been informed that he need not speak to the psychiatrist, might
very well refuse to be examined at all. If the state's case rests
largely on the results of a psychiatric examination, does the pa-
tient's refusal to make statements to the psychiatrist result in his
immediate release? Clever counsel, it seems, would avise his client
to remain silent and thereby prevent the state from obtaining the
necessary evidence for a commitment.' Indeed, since counsel is to
152. See 349 F. Supp. at 1 101, n. 33, which signals the waiver of counsel by a mental
incompetent.
153. "The objectives are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child
and protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment." Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
154. 349 F. Supp. at 1100-1101, quoting from In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 49-50, and
McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 250 (1972), (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
155. One author has even proposed that a defense lawyer's duty to his client extends to
the point of requiring that he at times engage in purposeful deception. Freedman,
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be adversary, the lawyer would be bound to advise his client to do
whatever would reduce the chances that he will be committed,
regardless of whether he believes the client would be "benefitted"
by the examination. Lessard not only ignores this possibility but
strongly suggests that the patient will "open up and tell all" if he
feels he is "being treated fairly." 5 ' It is doubtful that this result
would obtain if adversary counsel informed his client that "Wis-
consin may not, consistent with basic concepts of due process,
commit individuals on the basis of their statements to psychiatrists
in the absence of a showing that the statements were made with
'knowledge.' ",157
Within the context of the adversary process the conclusion that
according to the fifth amendment an individual should not be com-
pelled to make statements that could lead to a loss of liberty is
sound.' In the normal situation, however, the privilege against
self-incrimination works to protect individuals against being com-
pelled to reveal their own crimes, and consequently to protect them
against punishment5 ' for these crimes. In the civil commitment
situation, the privilege works to protect individuals from being
compelled to reveal their own diseases, and ironically enough, to
protect them from treatment'" for their diseases. This irony places
the defense attorney in an unenviable position. For example, if his
client is in a catatonic stupor, hardly able to feed or provide for
himself, and obviously needs to be committed, but cannot make
that decision himself, should the lawyer equate treatment with
punishment, and do everything possible to prevent his client from
being committed? Or, should he work hand-in-hand with the judge
and the parties seeking commitment to find a middle ground, pos-
sibly a less onerous facility for treatment such as an out-patient
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions,
64 MIcH. L. REv. 1469 (1966).
156. 349 F. Supp. at 1101.
157. Id., n. 33.
158. Id.
159. It does not matter whether the theory for confining the individual is that of retribu-
tim, rehabilitation, or general deterrence.
160. The term "treatment" is used here to show the polarity between two basic thoughts
in the area of involuntary civil commitment. First, mental commitment is justified on the
humanistic grounds that its purpose is treatment of the patient. Second, prospective patients
must be afforded standard procedural due process rights to insure that only those proved
beyond a reasonable doubt to be mentally ill will be confined. The rationale behind the latter
thought is protective, and proceeds from the assumption that treatment is in fact not being
afforded, but only a sort of prevention detention.
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mental health clinic? It seems obvious that the latter course would
be the most advisable, notwithstanding the fact that the adversary
system demands that the good attorney do the former.
Another ineresting question concerning the role the attorney is
to play in these proceedings, especially under adversary conditions,
is whether or not to attempt getting his client released from con-
finement pending a determination on pre-hearing detention. In
Lessard the court decided that detention for longer than two weeks
without a full hearing on the necessity for commitment was uncon-
stitutional. 6 ' Upon close examination, it appears that a laweyer
can attack even this two-week detention, or at least force the state
to show that such detention serves a compelling state interest and
is only for the amount of time required to accomplish the purpose
of the given state interest.'62 It is customary in criminal cases,
where probable cause that an individual has already endangered
society has been established, to permit most defendants to be re-
leased on bail prior to trial. The civil commitment cases do not
remotely suggest that a similar right be afforded those accused of
mental illness. This situation is ludicruous, for an accused mur-
derer may await his fate in relative freedom, while one accused
only of being ill, must remain in custody before the necessity of
confinement or treatment has been established. 6 '
This situation is probably caused by the fact that the right to
bail is normally discussed in light of the eighth amendment's prohi-
bition against excessive bail. Although the Supreme Court has
never decided whether there is a constitutional right to bail, several
Supreme Court decisions contain language that implies that bail
may be a due process right. 64 Although the Lessard court cannot
be criticized for not including this on its list of rights protected by
procedural due process, it would have done well to require at least
a stronger showing of dangerousness to justify pre-hearing deten-
tion than that required for post-hearing commitment. In addition,
161. 349 F. Supp. at 1098.
162. The court in Lessard fails to look at the issue of detention itself, and considers only
its length. 349 F. Supp. at 1092.
163. This seems required by the decision of In re Gault, supra, which laid to rest the
issue of whether the civil commitment proceedings were merely "civil" and not "criminal".
Specifically, in Gault, the Court found the distinction unpersuasive as a rationale for provid-
ing lesser procedural rights to juveniles in delinquency proceedings than were afforded to
adults charged with actual violations of the criminal law.
164. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1951) (Black and Frankfurter, JJ., dissent-
ing): Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
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the state could be required to demonstrate that pre-hearing deten-
tion is necessary for the particular patient, either for extended
examination of the patient or for the safety of society.
C. The Format of the Hearing and the Presentation of Medical
Testimony
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment affords a
full and fair hearing to any person facing a loss of liberty. The
Supreme Court has been very receptive recently to insuring that a
hearing be given to those who stand to lose a wide range of bene-
fits, either because of impending imprisonment' or loss of prop-
erty, 6  by the proceedings. It matters little that the loss of liberty
be characterized as incarceration or institutionalization; or
whether one is confined to a hospital instead of to a prison.'67
In Wisconsin, Lessard requires that notice of the hearing, no-
tice of the basis for the detention, the names of the examining
physicians and all other people who propose to testify in favor of
detention, and the substance of their testimony, be afforded the
prospective patient.6 8 The Lessard court found that there was no
need to decide at the present time "the precise nature of the hearing
that is required."'6 9 In reference to the exact nature of the hearing,
the court only stated that the decision of whether or not to commit
should be made at a judicial hearing presented in an adversary
context in which both sides have the right to cross-examine. 7 '
It is assumed that the purpose of requiring that the prospective
patient be given notice before the hearing is to insure not only that
he will be adeqiately informed of the nature of the charges against
him, but so that he can effectively rebut these charges with evi-
dence and witnesses of his own.' 7 1 It is also assumed that notice of
the names of all the people who propose to testify in favor of
165. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, and its progeny. But see MeKeiver v. Pennsyl-
vania, 403 U.S. 328 (1971), holding that trial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative
stage is not constitutionally required, for recent change in emphasis by the Supreme Court
for this area of the law.
166. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), teachers' employment con-
tracts; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), welfare benefits; Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), wage garnishment. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), involving removal of children from parents.
167. Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
168. 349 F. Supp. at 1092.
169. Id. at 1091.
170. Id.
171. Escalera v. New York Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
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detention, and the substance of their testimony, is required because
allowing the prospective patient to rebut evidence against him
would be of little value if, before the hearing, he was given no
information concerning the evidence to be presented against him. 72
These are principles well-grounded in the present law. In addition,
it is well established that the hearing should take place in the
presence of an impartial tribunal, 7 3 and the decision of whether
to commit or not to commit should be made solely on the evidence
adduced at the hearing. 74
The problems concerning mental commitment procedures are
different than those affecting other areas of the law. The future
awaits the resolution of several important issues concerning the
nature of the hearing to be afforded during these proceedings.
Paramount among these problems is the question of how to pre-
sent medical testimony to the trier of fact. If the hearing is to aid
the judge or jury in making the ultimate decisions, it becomes very
important to avoid formalistic medical conclusions about the med-
ical capacity of the accused. 75 One court has stated that the use of
such psychiatric code-words as schizophrenia, neurosis, etc., be
directed away from the courtroom.'76 The use of purely opinion
testimony can either confuse the judge or jury, hinder them from
getting at the underlying facts, 77 or force them to passively ac-
quiesce to the conclusions of the medical experts. 7 1 It thus becomes
imperative that the courts, in order to insure that the issue of
mental capacity be made upon sufficient information, require that
informative reports detailing the patient's condition, containing
both empirical test results and specific observations of the examin-
ing physicians, be presented. 79 McCormick in his work on Evi-
dence agrees with this. He states that the "core" of the opinion
172. Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 107 (1963) (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
173. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 271; cf In re Murchison, 349 U.S.133, 136 (1955);
Escalera v. Housing Authority, 425 F.2d at 863.
174. "The decision maker's conclusion . . . must rely solely on the legal rules and
evidence adduced at the hearing." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 271. See also Escalera v.
Housing Authority, 425 F.2d at 863. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
175. Kaufman, Evaluating Competency: Are Constitutional Deprivations Necessary?,
10 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 465, 480 (1972).
176. See, supra, note 145.
177. 390 F.2d at 450.
178. Kaufman, supra, note 174.
179. Id.
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evidence rule would be preserved by a rule "prescribing that the
trial judge in his discretion may require that a witness, before
giving testimony in terms of inference or general description, shall
first give the concrete details upon which the inference or descrip-
tion is founded, so far as feasible.""18 If such information is not put
in the hands of the court, or presented to the jury, it is doubtful
whether either one can proceed to the conclusion that involuntary
commitment is warranted."8 '
D. The Search for Alternatives and Rehabilitation
Since it appears that institutionalization of the mentally ill is
predicated upon treatment,' Lessard requires that a search for
alternatives be made. Assuming that the patient usually lacks the
necessary resources to cover the field of alternatives, the court
places the burden on the party seeking commitment to comprehen-
sively evaluate the spectrum of available choices. Several questions
arise, however, and two inconsistencies are readily apparent in this
portion of the opinion. First, since the statute failed to require the
"alternative means" test, the judge's failure to apply it was not
inconsistent with the statute. If the failure was a constitutional
defect in and of itself, the court should have found the statute (and
not merely the judge's actions) unconstituional for failing to re-
quire the application of the correct standard by the judge."3 Sec-
ond, confusion is created by the court's critical holding that the
party seeking commitment has the burden of considering alterna-
tives, which is then followed by the conclusion that the judge's
failure to consider alternatives was a denial of due process. Does
the Lessard court suggest that the judge is the party seeking com-
mitment, or only that if the initiating party fails to consider alter-
natives, the judge must do so?"'
Similar confusion was apparent in Lake v. Cameron,"' wherein
180. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 24 (1954); citing Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 57.
181. Kaufman, supra, note 174.
182. Id. at 482. See notes 114-124, and accompanying text. See also Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F. Supp. 1084, which states that involuntary civil commitment is "justified on the basis
of potential benefit to the one confined in a mental hospital."
183. This defect in the reasoning of the opinion does not effect the result of the decision,
as the statute in question was held unconstitutimal on the standard of proof issue.
184. A more consistent and reasonable approach might have been for the court to hold
that the burden of proof regarding alternatives rests on the party seeking commitment (as
it has done) and that, if the judge is not satisfied that the burden has been met, he should
dismiss the case.
185. 364 F.2d at 664.
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the court seemed to place a dual burden on the state and the court
to explore less drastic alternatives. There, however, the court em-
phasized that commitment proceedings are not strictly adversary,
thereby indicating that the court should become involved in the
process of exploring alternative remedies to commitment.'86 This
should follow, though, only if two conditions are present: (1) the
proceeding is merely a procedure seeking treatment, in which the
"accuser" has no interest in the outcome other than the interest
of the patient, and (2) the court has at its disposal the means to
analyze the alternatives upon which to decide the optional disposi-
tion. If the new Wisconsin statutes made necessary by Lessard
provide for a quasi-adversary treatment, rather than commitment,
proceeding and oblige the state to present a full range of explored
alternatives, the courts will be in a better position to order the form
of care that meets the needs of the patient.187
Requiring the "persons" seeking commitment, or the state, to
bear the burden of finding the least restrictive alternative is strong
medicine. Even where a hospital is found with an adequate in-
patient treatment facility, or a community mental health clinic
with adequate in-patient services, to require the patient to submit
to such treatment may be unwise, and indeed, unconstitutional,
because such treatment may not be the most suitable, or least
drastic alternative available to the patient. In Lake Judge Bazelon
stated that the court must determine whether or not less drastic
alternatives could achieve the same goal before ordering the com-
mitment for treatment. 88 Thus, it is arguable under both Lake and
Lessard89 that the state may be constitutionally compelled to order
out-patient rather than in-patient treatment if it can be proved that
both programs would cause the same ends. 9'
186. Id.
187. Wisconsin statutes already provide provisions for many different kinds of treat-
ment: WIs. STAT. § 51.22, Colonies and training schools; Wis. STAT. §§ 51.24-25, county
hospitals; Wis. STAT. § 51.36, Community mental health clinic services; Wis. STAT. § 51.37,
Outpatient clinic services; Wis. STAT. § 51.42, Community mental health, mental retarda-
tion, alcoholism and drug abuse services. What is needed is some kind of county coordina-
tion, especially in the northern counties, to insure uniform and diverse facilities for multi-
county units, made up of the lesser populated counties which cannot afford to make avail-
able to their residents all the alternatives listed above.
188. 364 F.2d at 657.
189. Lessard relied heavily on Lake.
190. Further evidence for this lies in the Supreme Court's decision in Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508-09 (1964), where the court recognized that the govern-
ment may not impose unnecessary restrictions on its citizens with regard to constitutonally
protected freedoms.
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The reason behind the requirement that alternatives be ana-
lyzed is an obvious change of emphasis from the simple commit-
ment, or containing, of the individual, to a desire that, if possible,
his cure be effected. To this end, it appears that in most cases out-
patient treatment should be preferred. In addition, the patient
should be able to participate, to whatever extent possible, in his
treatment. He should not become a passive recipient of treatment
except under the most compelling circumstances."'
If involuntary civil commitment is the only possible vehicle to
treat the patient, the period should not be so indefinite or indeter-
minate that the patient be confined until a cure is found, or until
"dangerousness" has ceased. The period of confinement, in all
cases, should be set for a definite, limited period of time. After that
period has run, the patient should be afforded another hearing to
determine whether his present confinement should be continued for
another designated term, or whether his situation has so improved
that he can be treated on an out-patient basis."' This procedure is
a necessary extention of the present statute9 3 relying on the theory
that involuntary civil commitment should only be turned to as a
last resort. Once the involuntary commitment has occurred, a
strong effort should be made not to forget the patient and let him
languish in a mental hospital for the rest of his life.'94 Periodic
review under the guidelines set in Lessard would alleviate this prob-
lem.,95
IV. CONCLUSION
Lessard v. Schmidt has been appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. It is unlikely, because of the numerous bases for
the decision in Lessard, that the Supreme Court will either reverse
or consider and rule upon each conclusion of the Lessard decision.
On appeal, the Court will have to look at each of the statutes
rejected in Lessard, and in my opinion, will probably choose a basis
for affirming the court's decision regarding each. Only the reason-
191. Milwaukee Journal, supra, note 112.
192. See notes 187-189, and accompanying text.
193. See WIs. STAT. § 51.11(1) (1971) only provides that any person adjudged mentally
ill "... may on his own verified petition or that of his guardian. . . have a re-examination
before any court of record .... "
194. As statistics have shown to be the case. See 349 F. Supp. at 1089, quoting statistics
found in Furman & Conners, Jr., The Pennsylvania Experiment in Due Process, 8
DUQUESNE L. REV. 32, 65-66 (1970).
195. The guidelines laid down by the Lessard court are found at 349 F. Supp. 1103.
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able doubt standard and the requirement that less severe alterna-
tives be investigated, are likely to be met with skepticism by the
Supreme Court.196 The other holdings, as explained previously, rest
on the quite settled notions of In re Gault and its progeny. Because
the decision does not intefere with the state's police power (a favor-
ite of the Burger Court) to commit the mentally ill, but addresses
itself only to the procedural requirements that the state must meet
in the exercise of that power, 117 Lessard v. Schmidt will in all
probability be substantially affirmed.
Even if severely dealt with by the Supreme Court and reversed
on one, or possibly two, grounds, Lessard will remain an important
case in Wisconsin law. It represents the opening of a large door,
allowing access to the assurance of procedural due process to a
segment of society which has not committed any violation of laws,
but has only been vaguely described as "dangerous to themselves
or others," and has thus been designated as being in need of
"treatment" for which they are to be involuntarily committed. It
also hopefully represents the commencement of legal attempts to
delineate the perimeters of the substantive right to treatment of
those individuals committed. Lessard allows us to hope. It mani-
fests a philosophy which dictates that the form of treatment to be
afforded mental patients in Wisconsin shall be both the least
onerous and the most beneficial alternative available to them.
Mental patients are to be treated in the most humane way possible,
they are to be guaranteed all the constitutional rights afforded
those in the criminal process, and they are not to be forgotten or
hidden behind closed doors. The time is ripe to solve some of
society's archaic ideas about mental illness and the treatment of
the mentally ill. As stated by Judge Bazelon, who might, for want
of a better name, be called the patron saint of the mentally ill:
Certainly the law approaches more closely every day the realiza-
tion that individuals have definite entitlements that they may
claim rather than request. We no longer regard the welfare client
as a supplicant who must accept our bounty with whatever de-
grading conditions we choose to attach. We may soon realize
196. See Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657. This opinion
may be an indication of the view of Lessard that the Chief Justice will take on appeal.
197. In this context, a recent statement made by Justice Douglas concerning the import-
ance of procedural rights is important. Found in the majority opinion of Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1970), Douglas states: "[i]t is significant that most of
the provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural, for it is procedure that marks much of
the difference between rule by law and rule by fiat."
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that the necessities of life are a matter of personal right and
societal duty, and not a bounty at all. Mental health is the most
basic of these necessities. We owe it to every man.19
If nothing more, Lessard has brought Judge Bazelon's concerns
closer to their consummation. For this, Wisconsin can be thankful.
From this, the lawyers, judges, physicians and psychiatrists, legis-
lators, and interested citizens of the state can move on to challenge,
attack, and ultimately define the procedures, rights and remedies
to be afforded not only the mentally ill, but also the alcoholics'99
and drug addicts, who are presently involuntarily detained or will
be involuntarily committed in the future. The time has arrived in
Wisconsin to treat mental illness as both a matter of public and
personal health. The time when it was treated as a matter of civil
liability to be punished by undefined lengths of involuntary civil
commitment and confinement has passed.
198. Among the important decisions written in the area of mental commitment, Baze-
Ion's decisions in Rouse v. Cameron, supra; Washington v. United States, supra; United
States v. Leazer (concurring), supra; and Lake v. Cameron, supra, carry great weight.
199. In this context, see Comment, Alcoholism Treatment in Wisconsin: The Need for
Legislative Reform, 1973 WIs. L. REv. 133.
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APPENDIX
Table of admissions to Wisconsin Mental Hospitals: 1965-1972.* The fol-
lowing table is presented as both a statistical reminder of the importance of
involuntary civil commitment procedures to the thousands of people affected
by them, and as a comparison of the means by which patients were admitted
to Wisconsin state and county mental institutions over a seven-year period.
TYPE OFADMISSION 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
I. TEMPORARY DETENTIONS
A. Court Order
(TOTAL)
Mendota State
Winnebago State
Other State Hosp.
County Hospitals
Milwaukee
All Others
B. Without Court
Order (TOTAL)
Mendota State
Winnebago State
Other State Hosp.
County Hospitals
Milwaukee
All Others
11. COMMITMENTS
A. Temporary Obser-
vational (TOTAL)
Mendota State
Winnebago State
Other State Hosp.
County Hospitals
Milwaukee
All Others
B. Continuing Reg-
ular (TOTAL)
Mendota State
Winnebago State
Other State Hosp.
272 255 261 275 267 338 319 340
167 143 155 149 155 192 194 166
104 112 105 126 112 145 125 174
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1,318 1,384 1,394 1,340 1,085 1,283 1,290 1,052
388 384 431 450 650 672 642 673
985 1,176
2 6
103 94
3 2
483 542 647 601 627 559 648 598
137 219 198 214 37 33 229 476
1,101 1,103
112 132
67 117
264 282
465 387 345
71 85 53
315 242 221 212 190
74 19 24 35 85
975 847
152 140
376 316
117 54
* Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services-Statistical Report-Basis
for Admission of Patients Admitted to Wisconsin State and County Mental Institu-
tions. Each figure represents statistics for the year ending June 30 of the indicated
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County Hospitals
Milwaukee
All Others
1 6 6 9 4 1 7 2
329 331 392 325 380 417 404 171
III. VOLUNTARY COMMITMENTS
A. Regular (TOTAL) 2,803 3,065 3,197 3,437 3,809 3,924 4,089 4,075
Mendota State 644 627 660 729 723 645 591 619
Winnebago State 397 508 538 542 567 573 596 528
Other State Hosp. 132 265 230 321 360 350 446 424
County Hospitals
Milwaukee 1,278 1,247 1,185 1,209 1,407 1,212 1,232 1,227
All Others 352 418 584 636 752 1,144 1,224 1,275
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